Consequence Management: Measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the impacts of an emergency.
Consequence management comprises those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Such services and activities may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, fire fighting, information planning, mass care, resources support, health and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food, and energy. Consequence management comprises those planning actions and preparations taken to identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response forces and to develop the executable plans implemented in response to an accident; and, the actions taken following an accident to mitigate and recover from the effects of an accident.
Consequence management is predominantly an emergency management function and includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the onsequences of terrorism. LinkedIn External link. Twitter External link. Subscribe to our newsletter External link.
The department acknowledges Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people as the Traditional Custodians of the land and acknowledges and pays respect to their Elders, past and present. Home Responsibilities Consequence management Consequence management. Over the next few years, it is expected that the HLS organization will establish a national emergency response command and control C2 system.
Many different systems exist today across the numerous departments and agencies that are being blended into the DHS. Each system was created for and is currently. Very few are interoperable. Indeed, in crisis and consequence management incidents over the last decade, responders consistently report that an unwieldy number of different radios and wireless devices were needed to talk to the other participants.
It is possible that lives were lost because the first responders were unable to communicate and share their situational awareness.
There is a strong need for an integrated system that allows the new HLS structure to conduct operations effectively; share a common operational picture built on a common database; provide multilevel security information to accommodate local, state, and federal needs; and facilitate real-time communications between these local, state, and federal entities. The Army has already designed a mobile battlefield network system that might meet many of the DHS needs.
MOSAIC is intended to provide on-the-move net communications for the mobile, geographically dispersed battlefield. Army, a. These networks differ from civilian and most other networks in being ad hoc, since there can be no fixed hubs on a moving battlefield.
Such systems would be very useful after an incident if there is a loss of civilian communications. The public switched network may, however, be degraded following a major physical or cyber terrorist attack, so the future system should consider the expeditionary characteristics inherent in Objective Force concepts. Local connectivity might be gained in such a system through applications like the Joint Tactical Radio System and, perhaps, local, mobile laser communications networks, or transportable microwave networks, which would provide the bandwidth to share data and gain a common operational picture.
This model can set the standards for local and state C2 architectures, so that the DHS can seamlessly. In the interim, the Army should investigate deployable communications packages equipped with universal multiplexer capability to facilitate C2 across the vast, and disparate, array of agencies that will respond to incidents and events.
The Blue Force Tracking architecture is designed to provide tracking, tagging, and locating of friendly troops and assets; logistics and asset management; and situational awareness. The Global Positioning System GPS -based concept can allow operational commanders to view the position of friendly forces in real time. Blue Force Tracking is being developed for U. The Army has explored many of the technologies necessary for an effective, end-to-end national emergency response C2 system.
If the system eventually adopted for the nation exploits and is compatible with Objective Force technologies, it can be beneficial to the Army. However, just as the Objective Force may have to operate with allies with various levels of modernization, the Army in discharging its HLS mission must address C2 compatibility with civilian responders.
Conclusion A new national emergency response command, control, and communications system for homeland security must be developed and fielded to meet the demands of the emerging threats, particularly to integrate the response to chemical, biological, high explosive, radiological, and nuclear weapons. This system must be compatible with developments in the new Department of Homeland Security, the U. Northern Command, and state and local entities. Current Army science and technology thrusts and programs that are integral to the Objective Force can be adapted for the new national system.
Recommendation To facilitate the development and fielding of an integrated command-and-control system for homeland security, the Army should initiate or continue research that permits the earliest possible fielding of deployable communications packages equipped with universal multiplexer capability to facilitate command and control across the vast, and disparate, array of agencies that will respond to incidents and events.
System to determine the location of operational personnel and assets from multiple agencies. A necessary condition to conduct R and CM activities is an assessment of the situation.
This program is designed to meet the needs of the warfighter. Key elements for the development and fielding of an HLS common operational picture are the development and fielding of a family of both wide-area and focused sensors; the networking of these sensors for situational assessment; the fusion of sensor data; and adapting models that predict physical damage, contamination, and casualties based on real-time reports and sensor information.
The situational awareness needed for HLS is closely related to the network-centric concepts inherent in the Objective Force; however, building such awareness is a complex problem because the operational picture must be shared by multiple agencies operating with mixed levels of systems and technologies. A number of sensors exist that can assist with the real-time situational assessment. Overhead imagery from satellites and high-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs can build an optical and infrared picture of the physical damage.
They can also use measurement and signal intelligence to determine WMD contamination. The family of tactical UAVs being fielded for the Objective Force can provide focused views of the HLS situation and be maneuvered to meet real-time needs of the on-scene commander.
Chemical, biological, and radiological CBR surface sensors can be implanted throughout the affected area to fill in the picture. Robotic land vehicles can be used to implant and locate a family of surface sensors to characterize the damage. Finally, as the needs become more focused, sensors that can look into structures and detect casualties in rubble will need to be developed and fielded to complete the picture.
Like the concepts and technology that underwrite the Objective Force, a common operational picture tailored to the demands of a specific contingency, integrated from wide-area sensors, filled in with tactically deployed air and land sensors, and augmented by specially designed and placed local sensors can help support the HLS mission.
The current state of sensors to characterize the effects and extent of CBR weapons varies. The post-attack assessment problem is easier technologically. However, it will be necessary to build the operational picture by networking multiple sensors and fusing the inputs into a common picture. For chemical weapons, local sensors are being fielded today, but there is still a need to improve the ability to characterize the attacks over a wide area.
As we saw from the anthrax attacks in late , a meticulous process of testing is necessary to identify the biological agent and to determine the extent. Nuclear and radiological detectors are the most highly developed sensors and can now be used to determine the extent of radiation.
Multiple sensor reports and images do not, by themselves, build the situational awareness and operational picture needed to conduct effective operations. The sensor pictures and reports need to be analyzed and depicted on a common grid and shared with the R and CM forces digitally. Fusion techniques are under development for the Objective Force, but here again the fusion technology for the HLS mission will need to be adapted to a related, but different, set of requirements.
If such an information fusion capability is developed, it can also be used for warfighting in scenarios where WMD is threatened or actually used.
Finally, a family of models that can predict physical damage, contamination, and casualties can play an important role in the HLS mission. CBR contamination models today show the effects of known weapons. For example, the Army Risk Assessment Model system provides specific capability to examine the fate and transport of toxic materials in the environment and the implications for ecosystems and human health.
The AT Planner is a good example of a technology whose use is currently restricted to the defense community or contractors that serve the defense community that could be of considerable use to the engineering community serving industry. However, the capabilities of these models need to be extended to predict contamination based on a limited set of reports and sensors readings. These models are based on computational fluid dynamics approaches and their incorporation into simplified models that can be used to predict the movement of contaminants through the atmosphere, a city, inside buildings, and in tunnels and subway systems.
As reported in Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism, work on this type of tool is proceeding, but results of the several models are often in disagreement. The new technical challenge will be to link contamination models to real-time sensor reports and images to provide for timely attack assessment. However, these are not readily obtainable in all localities and regions, nor can they be accessed in centralized databases.
The application of these structural models along with progressive collapse technology can be used to forecast building failures and damage from terrorist attacks. The challenge will be to link these existing models to existing and emerging sensors that monitor structural health and to adapt them to the specific needs of the Army and the HLS community.
The Army should participate in and encourage the establishment of centralized databases that include structural drawings and models for high profile and critical infrastructure buildings and facilities. The databases would be used for assessing damage and casualty states in the event of terrorist attacks. The application of these structural models could forecast building failures such as occurred at the World Trade Center. Table describes technologies for event assessment.
Rapid assessment of the effects of natural disasters and attacks using chemical, biological, high explosive, radiological, and nuclear weapons is essential to mitigate the damage, save lives, and restore order.
To some degree, the process for event assessment is similar to that used by the Objective Force in building a common operational picture; however, different sensors and analytical processes will be used. The Army should conduct research on processes and systems to facilitate the event assessment process. It should support the high-priority research such as sensor networking and fusion to merge reports from disparate sensors into a common picture. The forces employed for large-scale R and CM activities need to be protected for sustained operations.
Individual protection suits and inoculations are necessary to sustain operations in these conditions. The fielding of the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit and the Joint Service Protective Mask over the next few years will provide some needed improvements in individual protection at a lower maintenance cost while relieving the physiological burdens of heat stress and breathing resistance. Current SBCCOM research on materials for facepieces and lenses, advanced filters, and service-life indicators to improve masks will aid the Army and the civilian community and should be aggressively continued.
Integrated situational awareness displays that can be shared by operational planners and implementers. Continued development of point and wide-area sensors to characterize chemical, biological, and radiological contamination following an attack. Development and fielding of sensors to determine the state of damage to buildings and to locate casualties in structures.
Land mobile robotics that can breach obstacles to implant sensors that will characterize damage in a contaminated area. Enhancement of damage and contamination models to provide attack assessments based on the reports of fused sensor data. The direction of this research is to develop a family of selectively permeable membranes, reactive self-detoxifying materials, and electro-spun materials and to employ nanotechnology in this development effort.
Mobile collective-protection facilities are necessary for long-term R and CM activities. The Army is currently developing a family of deployable collective-protection shelters that can be used by forces performing CM tasks, local and state authorities and their supporting workforce, and victims of the event U.
Army, b, c. Some of the collective-protection shelters are independent facilities that can be rapidly assembled; others are liners for existing buildings. The research that is under way in individual and collective protection is important both to the Objective Force and to the HLS mission. The primary responsibility for the development of vaccines and medical countermeasures to protect against biological agents rests outside the Army, in the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control.
However, the expertise available in Army laboratories is essential to progress in this area, with the U. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases in particular being a unique source of expertise and continued research.
Table describes technologies appropriate for force protection.
0コメント